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JOHN

E.

IMPERT*

A Program for Compliance with the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and
Foreign Law Restrictions on the Use
of Sales Agents **
In this period of vast trade deficits the importance of exports to the American
economy has been increasingly recognized. How should U.S. exporters conduct
sales efforts abroad to comply with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)'
and related local laws, yet still compete effectively with exporters from other
countries? The United States is the only industrialized nation whose laws forbid
improper payments both at home and in other jurisdictions. 2 United States exporters, therefore, face unique hurdles in complying with the laws of the country
to which an export is directed and with U.S. legal constraints on their manner of
selling.
The FCPA was enacted to fight bribery. A few commentators have attempted
to analyze the effect of the FCPA's bribery prohibitions on U.S. exports. 3 Given
the sensitive nature of the subject matter, however, no convincing conclusions
have been reached. Since its enactment in 1977, the FCPA has been criticized,
praised, and finally revised in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
*Assistant General Counsel, The Boeing Company, Seattle, Washington.
**The Editorial Reviewer for this article was Kevin M. Harris.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l, 78dd-2 (1988).
2. See Gevurtz, Using the Antitrust Laws to Combat Overseas Bribery by ForeignCompanies:
A Step to Even the Odds in InternationalTrade, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 211, 212 (1987) and sources
collected in n.4; Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: What Is to Be Done with the FCPA, 20
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 431, 446 (1987).
3. See, e.g., G. GREANIAS & D. WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICE AcT: ANATOMY OF
A STATUTE 122, 123 (1982); Longobardi, supra note 2, at 447; Comment, The FCPA of 1977: A
Solution or a Problem, 11 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 111, 113 (1981); Note, The Antibribery Provisions of
the FCPA of 1977: Are They Really as Valuable as We Think They Are?, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 71, 82
(1985); THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 1988, at 22. In his preliminary comments to a bibliography on the
FCPA, Steven Perkins notes that "[f]ew articles have been written on the bribery provisions."
Perkins, Bibliography on the FCPA of 1977, 14 W. ST. U. L. REV. 491 (1987).
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1988. 4 This article, after preliminary remarks on the phenomenon of bribery,
describes the prohibitions of the FCPA and the effect, if any, of the recent
amendments. It then surveys legal prohibitions outside of the United States that
are applicable to the sales activities of U.S. exporters and describes strategies for
compliance with all such laws and regulations.
I. Bribery
Bribes and kickbacks are said to have been inseparable from human commerce
since recorded time. 5 In the view of The Economist, however, rapid economic
growth and the emergence of a strong middle class in the nineteenth century have
led to a relatively effective legal prohibition of bribery in many industrialized
countries. 6 The middle class's devotion to hard work as the route to success has
been seen as antithetical to the widespread corruption that earlier reigned. Today
bribery tends to be a pervasive part of the culture only of poor countries. Skeptical of the effectiveness of attempts such as the FCPA's to export the morality
of industrialized countries, yet concerned about Europeans' inattention to the
problem, The Economist concludes that "[t]he Europeans . . . hurt themselves
by their complacency, but they hurt developing countries more. In the end it is
up to poor countries to defend themselves from foreigners' corruption--as well
as from their own." 7 In short, demands and opportunities for commercial bribery
remain, 8 and legal and business strategies are required to deal with them.
II. The Enactment of the FCPA in 1977
As an outgrowth of the initial Watergate investigation of the mid-1970s, the
special prosecutor's report revealed that payments had been made to foreign
agents, some part of which were returned to U.S. exporters to augment domestic
political slush funds. 9 Yet, most funds remained with the foreign agents, and
some of those funds were shown to have been used as bribes to obtain foreign
business. The initial bribery revelations were pursued by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) as disclosure violations. The aggregate amount of
payments was impressive. The largest disclosed were payments by Exxon of
$56.7 million, by Northrup of $30.7 million, and by Lockheed of $25 million. 10
4. Pub. L. 100-418, § 5003; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1988).
5.

See S. MACMULLEN, CORRuPTION AND THE DECLINE OF ROME (1988); J. NOONAN, BRIBES

839 (1984).
6. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 3.

7. Id.
8. For a description of the reputed official French system of bribery in less-developed countries,
see Krop, LArgent Noir de la France, L'Evdnement du Jeudi, Sept. 29, 1988, at 51.
9. Timmeny, An Overview of the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 235 (1982); see also
Brickey, CorporateCriminal Liability: A Primerfor CorporateCounsel, 40 Bus. LAW. 129 (1984).

10. G.

GREANIAS
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supra note 3, at 20-22.
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After an abortive attempt at a legislative response during the Ford administration to what was believed to be widespread American business bribery, the
FCPA was enacted in the moralistic climate of the early Carter administration. It
prohibited bribery of foreign government officials, granted enforcement responsibilities jointly to the SEC and the Department of Justice, and added some very
general accounting rules. The FCPA has been described as a "hodgepodge of
conflicting ends and means . .. Originally envisioned strictly as a disclosure
statute, ...the act was finally transformed into a prohibitory criminal statute;
nevertheless, the ties to the securities laws were maintained.""1
After more than ten years' experience, the effect of the FCPA on American
business and its sales practices abroad remains largely unknowable. The Economist, comparing the U.S. share of exports in countries it considers to be corrupt
versus the share in noncorrupt countries, concludes that the share has increased
by a roughly equivalent percentage in both categories of countries. 12 The implication is that no business has been lost on an aggregate basis. Such categories are
highly subjective, however, and within each category, countries have experienced quite different rates of growth, so perhaps, but for the FCPA, total U.S.
exports would have increased more. There are no documented answers.
Legal commentators, who may be relatively unconstrained by facts, have
speculated freely. Contrast, respectively, these claims of victory over bribery,
laments of lost business, and the certainty that the FCPA's uncertainty is the root
of the problem: "[T]he FCPA has succeeded in preventing bribery by U.S.
agents in foreign countries. . . ,,13 "Members from each sector of the business
community found that their profits were decreasing from lost foreign business."' 14 "[T]he Act is causing corporations to be overcautious and turn down
legitimate business opportunities because they are unsure whether a proposed
transaction will violate the FCPA." 15
In the end the effect of the FCPA is unknowable in individual cases of lost
business because successful bribery by the winning competitor, if it has actually
occurred, can almost never be proved. Short of proof "beyond a reasonable
doubt," sellers realize they have little choice but to keep quiet. Public speculation by the losing bidder that the winner paid a bribe is likely to earn the enmity
of the public officials who are the target of the complaint. While the loser may
gain some psychic satisfaction, the loser is unlikely to gain any future business.
Thus, it is unrealistic to expect, as one commentator has suggested, that "[i]f a
company is harmed by a competitor's bribe to a foreign government official, the
damaged company is likely to provide helpful information to the SEC or the

11. Id. at 5.
12. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 3, at 21.

13. Note, supra note 3, at 82.
14. Id.
15. Longobardi, supra note 2, at 447.
WINTER 1990

1012

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

Department of Justice ..
16 On the contrary, the loser will gripe privately and
perhaps give up on that particular market.
A.

THE BRIBERY PROVISIONS

As enacted in 1977, and assuming a use of the mails or other instrumentality
of interstate commerce, a violation of the bribery provisions of the FCPA occurred when the four following elements were met: (1) a corrupt payment or offer
to pay anything of value was made; (2) to (a) a foreign official; (b) a foreign
political party, party official, or candidate; or (c) an intermediary for any such
person; (3) while knowing or having reason to know that the purpose of the
payment was to influence any official act or decision of the foreign official, party,
or candidate (including a decision not to perform a function or to use influence);
and (4) the payment was made to assist an issuer or domestic concern in obtaining or retaining business or directing business to any person.' 7 The 1977 FCPA
covered both issuers whose securities were registered with the SEC and all other
forms of domestic business concerns, whether carried on by individuals or in
corporate or partnership form. The most crucial element, particularly when an
intermediary was used, was the requirement of knowledge or "reason to know"
of the corrupt payment and purposes. An exception was made, however, for
facilitating or "grease" payments to foreign government employees whose duties were essentially ministerial or clerical.
The SEC and the Department of Justice were given shared responsibility for
investigation and enforcement of the FCPA bribery provisions. The SEC could
seek injunctions of civil violations by SEC reporting companies and their officers, directors, employees, agents, and stockholders. The Department of Justice had similar authority for violations of other domestic concerns. However, the
Department of Justice alone was responsible for criminal prosecutions under the
Act.
The FCPA also included accounting provisions intended to deter bribery
through increased public scrutiny of corporate practices. Every SEC reporting
company was required to make and keep books and records that, in reasonable
detail, accurately and fairly reflected the disposition of the issuer's assets, and to
devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls.' 8 The implementation of the accounting provisions of the FCPA was generally left in practice to
the accounting profession. As primarily an accounting concern and secondarily
a line of defense to bribery, the accounting provisions are not discussed in detail
in this article.

16. Note, Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.: Should There Be a Bribery
Exception to the Act of State Doctrine?, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 407, 422 (1984).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l, 78dd-2 (1977).
18. Id.
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111. 1988 Amendments to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
On August 23, 1988, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act amended
the FCPA provisions concerning knowledge of illegal conduct and the definition
9
of facilitating or grease payments and also added several affirmative defenses.'
The primary reason for the amendments was the perceived concern of the business community and Congress that the scope of the FCPA's prohibitions, particularly as to "reason to know," was20too uncertain and was leading unnecessarily to lost sales by U.S. exporters.
A.

REASON TO KNOW

The FCPA originally prohibited any payment to a third party "while knowing
or having reason to know that all or a portion" of the payment would be used to
bribe foreign officials. 2 1 As many companies engage the services of third parties
abroad to assist in marketing their products, most commonly on a commission
basis, this section was primarily intended to prohibit the use of such intermediaries as a conduit for the payment of bribes.
Apart from the perceived evil of serving to disguise an illegal payment,
foreign agents or intermediaries serve a multitude of legitimate purposes in
foreign sales efforts. Export sales are inherently uncertain, particularly for "big
ticket" items, and marketing efforts over several years may be needed to effect
a single sale. The cost of maintaining a U.S. expatriate employee in a foreign
country over such an extended period could be prohibitive, and for that reason
many companies prefer to use local "reps" who receive a fee contingent upon
the sale. Third parties who are so engaged are often called sales agents, sales
representatives, or sales consultants. For the purposes of this article, all will be
referred to as sales agents or intermediaries. While the amount of the fee received
by the sales agent could be very large, even as a small percentage of the cost of
an expensive product, the sales agent also runs the risk of expending many years
of futile effort on a particular project and receiving nothing at all.
If "reason to know" was construed broadly under the FCPA as originally
enacted, a question arose as to whether the engagement of any sales agent would
be suspect in a country thought to be corrupt. Another question was the extent
legitimate reasons for engaging a sales agent negated "reason to know" if the

19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-I, 78dd-2 (1988).
20. H. R. CONF. REP. ON H.R. 3, OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETrVENEss AcT OF 1988, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 916 (1988) [hereinafter CONF. REP.]; see also Brickey, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendment of 1988, 2 CORP. CRIM. LIABILITY, No. 4, at 1, 3 (1989), Bliss & Spak, The
Foreign CorruptPractices Act of 1988: Clarificationor Evisceration?, 20 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.

441,451 (1989); Roberts, Revision of the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct by the 1988 Omnibus Trade
Bill: Will It Reduce the Compliance Burdens and Anticompetitive Impact?, 1989 B.Y.U.L. REV. 491,
495, Turza, Corrupt Practices Act: How FarHave We Come?, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 5, 1990, at 5.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(3) (1977).
WINTER 1990
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sales agent later did engage in bribery. In the minds of commentators, "hazy
prohibitions" in the 1977 FCPA such as "reason to know" were seen to have
curtailed legitimate promotional efforts and to have "deterred many American
' 22
businesses from making any payment, legal or not, to secure business.
The 1988 amendments deleted "reason to know" and imposed liability for an
illicit payment only if it was made with "knowledge" that all or a part of the
payment would be used for bribery. "Knowledge," however, was then defined
as follows:
(A)A person's state of mind is "knowing" with respect to conduct, a circumstance,
or a result if(i) such person is aware that such person is engaging in such conduct, that such
circumstance exists, or that such result is substantially certain to occur; or
(ii) such person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that such result
is substantially certain to occur.
(B) When knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is required for an
offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of the
existence of such circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such circumstance does not exist. 23 In short, "reason to know" has simply been redefined as a
"high probability" of knowledge of a fact or that a result is "substantially certain" to

occur.
By way of background, the new definitions set forth in the amendments are
derived from the Model Penal Code and have been interpreted in the courts under
several criminal statutes. As explained in the Conference Report on the 1988
FCPA amendments, knowledge of a criminal act encompasses such phrases as
"deliberate avoidance of knowledge," "willful blindness," "conscious disregard of the facts," or "a head in the sand. ' 24 The basic difficulty with such
metaphors is that once a bribe has occurred, the hindsight which is thereby
gained means to many people that, in retrospect, it was highly probable that a
bribe would (and in fact did) occur.
The most practical way to try to protect against the application of such retrospective analysis is to conduct a "due diligence" investigation at the time the sales
agent is retained. The exporter's records can then demonstrate that, at all relevant
times, there were no facts indicating any probability of an illicit payment.
Cases that have applied the "willful disregard" test in interpreting other
criminal statutes have underlined this duty to investigate. For example, in United
States v. Kaplan25 an attorney was convicted of defrauding insurance companies
through submitting false medical bills. The defendant argued that he did not
know that the bills forwarded to him were false. The conviction was upheld
because clients and insurance companies had asserted in the past that the bills

22. G. GREANIAS & D. WINDSOR, supra note 3, at 122.

23. 15 U.S.C. & 78dd-2(h)(3) (1988).
24. CONF. REP., supra note 20, at 920-21.

25. 832 F.2d 676 (Ist Cir. 1987).
VOL. 24, NO. 4
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were too high, and despite these warnings, the attorney had made no effort to
investigate.
In the abstract, the new definition is certainly narrower than an undefined
"reason to know." However, the limited number of cases that have been prosecuted under the bribery provisions of the FCPA all have involved sets of facts
with no ambiguity at all as to the intended purpose of the illicit payments. 26
Thus, the practice of the SEC and the Department of Justice has been to concentrate upon clear violations, and the most that can be expected from this
portion of the amendments is to help ensure that such practice will continue.
B.

GREASE PAYMENTS

The definition of facilitating, or grease payments, which were permitted in the
original 1977 FCPA, depended upon the identity or status of the foreign official
who was the ultimate payee. Foreign officials to whom payments were legal
' 27
consisted of those whose duties were "essentially ministerial or clerical.
Thus, in order to benefit from the exemption for grease payments to minor
foreign officials, it was necessary to determine whether their duties were ministerial or clerical as opposed to policy-making. This distinction was not always
evident, particularly in unfamiliar cultures, and might have required a local
administrative law opinion from counsel.
The 1988 amendments eliminated this status test in favor of a straightforward
exception for payments made to secure "routine governmental action."- 28 The
focus was thus changed from the status of the payee to the purpose for which
payment was made. The statute defined "routine governmental action" in terms
of a laundry list of petty bureaucratic tasks such as issuing permits and licenses
and processing visas. However, to make clear that the exception was not to
swallow up the rule, the definition of "routine governmental action" did not
include "any decision by a foreign official ...to award new business or to
continue business with a particular party .... 29
In practice it may be surmised that few U.S. or foreign legal opinions have
ever been sought on making grease payments. Such payments are likely to be
made, if at all, by local freight forwarders, customs agents, or other local service
organizations in the foreign country whose modest fees encompass even more
modest tips or grease payments to local officials to speed up administrative
actions, all without the knowledge of the U.S. client.

26. See enforcement actions and review releases collected in FOREIGN CORRUPT

PRACTICES ACT

110-25 (1979) [hereinafter FCPA REP.] and particularly Department of Justice cases at
125. "To date, the SEC enforcement actions can be characterized as conservative in that they have
used the FCPA only as an added count in cases they would have brought anyway." Id. at 110.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(2) (1977).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A) (1988).
29. Id.
REPORTER

WINTER 1990
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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

The 1988 FCPA amendments added two affirmative defenses for certain categories of expenditures. First, it is now an affirmative defense that the payment
was "lawful under the written laws and regulations of the foreign official's...
country." 30 It is hard to imagine any payment that an overzealous U.S. prosecutor would claim to be a bribe that would nonetheless be explicitly permitted by
the laws of a foreign country. So, again a theoretical clarification without much
practical significance has occurred. Second, it is an affirmative defense that the
payment was a reasonable expenditure on behalf of a foreign official directly
related to the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services
or the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government or
agency. 3' This second affirmative defense simply reflects an existing Department
of Justice enforcement policy that payments to reimburse foreign officials for
visits to product demonstrations or tours of manufacturing facilities are not venal
and should not be classified as corrupt. 32 Once again, no change of significance
has occurred.
Although, as noted earlier, this article does not cover matters primarily within
the province of accountants, one of the 1988 amendments to the provisions on
accounting records and internal audit controls is of interest to lawyers. A corporation's FCPA responsibility for keeping records and for internal accounting
controls of its subsidiaries has been clarified. If the corporation owns less than a
majority of the shares of the foreign company, its compliance with the FCPA as
to such company is presumed whenever good faith efforts have been demonstrated to influence the company "to the extent reasonable under the . . . cir-

cumstances" to comply with the recordkeeping and internal accounting control
requirements. 3 Whether or not such good faith efforts were reasonable will be
determined by such factors as "the relative degree of.

.

. ownership

. . .

and the

laws and practices governing
the business operations of the country in which
' 34
such firm is located.
As a planning matter, therefore, whenever a U.S. corporation holds a significant minority shareholding in a foreign company as more than a passive investor, the subject of proper recordkeeping and internal accounting controls should
be made an agenda item at an early board meeting. If the foreign majority owners
object to the scope of the recordkeeping and internal accounting controls proposed by the representative of the U.S. minority shareholder, perhaps because of
the costs involved, the representative can at least propose a resolution to adopt
the degree of auditing that the representative believes is appropriate. If the
30. Id. § 78dd-l(c)(I).
31. Id. § 78dd-1(c)(2).
32. FCPA REP., supra note 26.

33. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6) (1988).
34. Id.
VOL. 24, NO. 4

FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

1017

resolution is voted down by representatives of the majority shareholders, then
sufficient efforts at compliance would seem to have been made, and the U.S.
shareholder's obligations under the accounting provisions of the FCPA would
seem to have been satisfied.
D.

PENALTIES

As a last matter, in addition to modifying the requirements for a violation of
the FCPA, the 1988 amendments increased the penalties. The maximum fine for
a corporation has been increased from $1 million to $2 million, while the maximum penalty for an individual has been increased from $10 thousand to $100
thousand. The possibility of imprisonment for up to five years remains unchanged. In addition, a new civil penalty of $10 thousand per violation may be
imposed on corporations and individuals by the SEC or the Department of
Justice. Finally, individual corporate employees may now be convicted even if
the corporation has not been found to have violated the FCPA . 3
IV. A Program for FCPA Compliance
As has been implied, these relatively minor 1988 amendments to the FCPA are
unlikely to change the way a U.S. corporation makes sales abroad. In a close
case, conviction under the FCPA may now be more difficult. However, U.S.
corporations and their employees will never wish to be put in a position of relying
upon the marginal impact of the 1988 amendments. Wherever the line is drawn
in any particular case between permissible and impermissible behavior, people
will wish to be comfortably within the permissible zone. In practice this means
that U.S. corporations and their employees must continue to exercise "due diligence" to ensure that any violation of the FCPA that may occur has not been
authorized and has happened without the knowledge of anyone subject to the Act.
As noted earlier, a duty to investigate is an inherent aspect of the "willful
disregard" test in cases that have applied the "knowledge" concept in other
criminal statutes. 36 It is true that Congress rejected a proposed due diligence
defense to the FCPA under which a corporation could escape liability for the
unauthorized actions of its employees if it demonstrated that it had established
procedures reasonably expected to prevent and detect such violations. 37 However, even without a statutory exemption, due diligence will continue to be an
implicit defense in establishing the absence of the requisite degree of knowledge. 38
35. Id. § 78dd-2(g).
36. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
37. CONF. REP., supra note 20, at 922.
38. For a contrary view, see Comment, The FCPA and Other Arguments Against a Due Diligence
Defense to Corporate Criminal Liability, 29 UCLA L. REV. 447, 449 (1982).
WINTER 1990
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In achieving an adequate level of due diligence, procedures should be adopted
that govern how a foreign sales agent is retained. An awareness must exist of
"red flags," which could indicate the possibility of a corrupt payment. Among
such warning signs are a request for a commission at a level substantially above
the going rate for agency work in a particular country. An excessively large
commission could suggest that part of the commission has been earmarked for a
corrupt payment to a government official. Family or business ties with government officials should be disclosed and examined to determine if a relationship
exists that could suggest an illicit payment. A request that the commission be
paid in a third country could imply a shared scheme for the avoidance of local
exchange controls or income taxes or a plan to divide the commission in the third
country with a proscribed payee. An answer to this latter problem is to refuse to
make payments of commissions in any third country.
Procedures for the appointment of sales agents should be tailored to the business operations of the U.S. exporter. 39 A written policy should cover an appropriate level of internal approvals, including, perhaps, the chief executive in
major appointments. Typical information to accompany a request for an appointment of a sales agent should include an application by the candidate setting forth
relevant business information, as well as detailing any family or business ties to
government officials and prior positions held in government by the candidate.
The request should also include a report on the applicant's character by those
persons in the exporter's organization who have met the applicant, along with the
results of reference checks. The absence of any prohibited government relationship can sometimes be confirmed by the United States Consulate in the foreign
country. If the U.S. exporter has a matrix-type organization with an international
staff independent of the division or subsidiary that seeks to make the sale, then
internal checks and balances can be introduced by requiring sign-offs from both
the selling unit's personnel and personnel of the separate international sales staff.
Once an adequate record has been established to demonstrate a bona fide
business reason for the appointment, a written agreement is needed to govern the
relationship between the sales agent and the exporter and to set forth representations and warranties by the sales agent. First, the agreement should contain
such usual provisions that the sales agent is an independent contractor with no
authority to commit the exporter, that the terms of the agreement may be disclosed if required by any relevant authority, and that the agent shall comply with
all laws and regulations of the United States and the country of sale. 40 In addi39. For an example of ITT Corp.'s early policy on retaining sales agents, see App. III to
Symposium, The FCPA: Domestic and International Implications, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM.
234, 376 (1982).
40. For a comprehensive discussion of dealer agreements, see Herold & Knoll, Negotiating and
Drafting International Distribution, Agency, and Representative Agreements: The United States
Exporter's Perspective, 21 INT'L LAW. 939 (1987), and Saltoun & Spudis, International Distribution
and Sales Agency Agreements: Practical Guidelines for U.S. Exporters, 38 Bus. LAW. 883 (1983).
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tion, the agreement should contain FCPA-oriented clauses such as representations that the agent is not an employee, officer, or representative of any government, or agency or instrumentality of any government, or of a political party, and
is not a candidate for political office. The agreement should include an obligation
to inform the U.S. exporter promptly of any change in any representation. The
agent should undertake not to use any portion of its commission to make any
payment or gift directly or indirectly to any employee, officer, or representative
of the foreign government under circumstances where such payment would constitute a bribe, kickback, or illegal payment under U.S. or applicable foreign
laws. Finally, the U.S. exporter should be excused from performance, ot empowered to terminate the agreement, either upon a violation of its terms and
conditions or if the agreement itself is found to be impermissible under the laws
of the United States or the foreign country. Although the FCPA encompasses
only illicit payments to government officials and politicians, U.S. exporters
should also forbid payments to commercial customer representatives and kickbacks to its own personnel.
The American penchant for disclosure suggests a last precaution, that of
formally notifying the customer of the appointment after the due diligence process has been completed and the agreement signed. If there is no notification,
embarrassment could occur if a government official expresses surprise that some
person has recommended an exporter's product without disclosing that he or she
stood to gain by a sale. Worse yet, if an illicit payment is later proved, the fact
that the relationship was a secret might intimate some knowledge of the bribe.
Thus, once the appointment is completed, the U.S. exporter should send a letter
to the chief executive of the customer or the head of the government department
giving notice of the appointment and any related limitations on its scope, such as
a lack of authorization to commit the U.S. exporter. Of course, if many potential
customers are located in the country, it may be impractical to identify and notify
them in advance. At a minimum, however, the contract with the sales agent could
require notification of each customer orally at the first meeting.
V. Local Law Survey
The initial focus of this article has been U.S. legal restraints on selling activities abroad. The other half of the equation is local law restraints in the
targeted foreign country of sale. To what extent should the U.S. exporter familiarize itself with relevant foreign restrictions, both anticorruption laws analogous
to the FCPA and other laws and regulations that might constrain selling activities
or regulate the legal relationship with the sales agent?
In any decision to appoint a foreign sales agent, the U.S. exporter should have
information on local law restrictions covering: (i) the use of intermediaries in govemnment or military sales; (ii) any limits on the method or amount of compensation;
and (iii) any nationality requirements for the sales agent. If the appointment itself is
WINTER 1990
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permissible, the U.S. exporter should know if the appointment must be disclosed or
if the sales agent must register the fact of the appointment or the terms of the agreement. Finally, dealer protection laws are common in many parts of the world, particularly in Europe and South America, and the U.S. exporter should be aware of the
potential cost of termination or of failure to renew the agreement. 4'
In some cases it may be feasible to rely on the proposed foreign sales agent as
a source of such information. As the agent is likely to be a national or a resident
of the targeted country of sale, he or she should know what laws or regulations
apply to sales activities. However, the agent will not be a reliable source of
information on dealer protection laws, including termination indemnities to
which the agent could be entitled and legal techniques to avoid such liabilities.
Even if the agent is aware of formal or informal restrictions on the use of agents
in government sales, he or she might ignore the restrictions, hoping they will not
be applied. On a worst case basis, if the customer later attempts to forbid
payment of a commission in the ultimate sales contract, the U.S. exporter might
have to choose between losing the sale or incurring a lawsuit by the customer or
the unpaid agent. The most prudent course for the U.S. exporter is therefore to
understand the foreign legal environment.
An appendix to this article sets forth a number of charts of foreign restrictions
on the appointment of sales agents in a series of countries in Africa, the Asia
Pacific region, the Caribbean and Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East.
The charts have been derived from legal surveys that the Boeing Company has
obtained for the countries involved. 42
Some generalizations can be made about the types of restrictions likely to be
encountered in each geographic area. In Africa and Europe there are few restrictions on the appointment of sales agents. Some European countries do have
limitations on termination of the sales agency agreement, however, and it may be
costly to terminate or fail to renew such an agreement after it has been in effect
for a few years. In the Asia Pacific region, the governments of Korea, Pakistan,
Taiwan, and Thailand have announced restrictions on the use of sales agents in
military or government sales. India can be added to this list, as restrictions have
at times been applied on an ad hoc basis, seemingly correlated with anticorruption campaigns in the local press.
41. See Herold & Knoll, supra note 40, at 965; Saltoun & Spudis, supra note 40.
42. Using a Chicago-based international law firm, the Boeing Company has obtained written
legal surveys on the laws of numerous foreign countries covering those sales agent issues, among
others, enumerated in the charts. Pursuant to a practice established by Douglas P. Beighle, Senior
Vice President and Secretary, the opinions are updated on a regular basis. Other, less costly, written
sources of such information include legal news updates in Middle East Executive Reports and East
Asian Executive Reports. In the event counsel decides to research such issues directly, basic guidance
on foreign legal research is found in Janis, The Lawyer's Responsibilityfor Foreign Law and Foreign
Lawyers, 16 INT'L LAW. 693 (1982). For thoughts on factors in the choice of foreign counsel, see
Impert, Relations with Outside Counsel in Asia Pacific, 19 INT'L LAW. 29 (1985) and Selecting and
Managing Foreign Litigation Counsel, I INT'L Q., No. 3, at 1 (1989).
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If the foreign country purports to limit the use of sales agents in government
sales, one legally permissible solution may be to engage the agent on a retainer
basis unconnected with the level of sales, thereby permitting a certification that
no commission will be paid that is contingent upon the sale. Of course from a
purely business viewpoint, a retainer represents a fixed expense that may never
be recouped from a successful sale. Thus, exporters are likely to resist retainer
relationships.
In the Caribbean and Latin America, restrictions on the termination of the
agreements of sales intermediaries are found in Central America, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. In some countries this exposure may be mitigated by
retaining a sales agent who is incorporated, thereby avoiding what local courts
could otherwise characterize as an employment relationship. A few nationality
requirements also exist for sales agents, which appear, however, to be rarely
enforced.
In the Middle East and North Africa legal restrictions on the use of sales agents
are widespread. Limitations on the use of agents in military sales are found
nearly everywhere. Registration requirements are common, including, on occasion, an obligation to file the contract in some public registry. With regard to
restrictions on termination of the agreement, in contrast to Europe and Latin
America where money damages are likely, in the Middle East the local authorities may not permit the appointment of a new agent until the foreign exporter
settles amicably with the agent to be terminated. Under such circumstances, the
departing agent holds considerable bargaining power. Local law restrictions on
termination of the agreement, other than in the Middle East, can sometimes be
avoided by making the agreement subject to the laws of a state in the United
States. However, such restrictions can be viewed as a matter of public policy in
the foreign country, and a contractual agreement on the application of U.S. law
may be ignored by local tribunals.4 3
The foreign law charts in the appendix are intended as a guide to further
research rather than as a definitive statement of local law and policy. For a start,
further inquiry is required to determine the scope of any restriction. Kuwait, for
example, requires the appointment of a local agent in most sales, while Saudi
Arabia requires local agents (called service agents) only in government sales.
Once local law has been researched, a judgment must sometimes be made as to
whether a local regulation is seriously intended to be enforced. Nationality requirements are examples that are not infrequently ignored in practice.
Although the charts refer mostly to local laws and regulations, customer
policies can be equally important. If the customer is likely to require the U.S.
exporter to certify that it has not used a sales agent, the fact that such requirement is a customer policy rather than a statute may make little difference. Apart

43. See Saltoun & Spudis, supra note 40, at 894.
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from the bad customer relations that could arise from a false certification, the
foreign country may have a criminal false statement statute that could apply to a
certification to a government customer. If the sale is to be financed by Exim Bank
or by Foreign Military Sales credits, a U.S. mail or wire fraud violation could
arise from a false certification in the United States. 4 Information on customer
policy is sometimes included in requests for proposals or may be learned through
inquiries of the customer and others in the industry.
Foreign registration requirements are most pertinent when they focus on the
particular activities of the agent rather than on something as innocuous as doing
business requirements. If sales agents must be listed in a special registry, the
bona fides of an agent will be questionable if the agent is not registered. Once
again a danger exists, that in hindsight, the U.S. exporter will be judged to have
had knowledge of an illegal payment if its local agent operated illegally or in
secrecy.
The charts in the appendix do not cover currency exchange controls and local
"revolving door" laws for military or government personnel. Currency exchange controls are unlikely to affect the U.S. exporter directly because in most
cases it would not be a legal resident of the foreign country. Nevertheless, public
disclosure of a violation by the agent of exchange controls or local income tax
laws is bound to result in bad publicity for the U.S. exporter, as well as for the
agent. Responses to this area of risk can include a requirement for a certificate
from the agent that the agent will comply with local tax and exchange control
requirements, a refusal by the U.S. exporter to make payment to any third
country, and a policy against making payment to any account identified only by
a number.
"Revolving door" laws are common in many foreign countries. They typically prohibit former or retired government employees from working as sales
agents to their former departments for a year or two after leaving government
service. The possibility that such a prohibition would apply can be gleaned from
the application prepared by the prospective foreign sales agent. If the individual
has left government service very recently, a specific inquiry can be made as to the
existence and applicability of such restrictions.
VI. Summary
The FCPA remains a formidable danger for any U.S. exporter engaged in
foreign selling activities. While the U.S. exporter's own employees, particularly
U.S. citizens or residents subject to the FCPA, are unlikely to violate its prohibitions, regular legal and ethics training is advisable. The primary danger of a
violation of the FCPA remains in the activities of a foreign sales agent or an

44. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1988).
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intermediary steeped in another culture, particularly in a country where illicit
payments may be prevalent.
This article, having outlined the FCPA and the minimal effects of the 1988
amendments, has focused on a practical program of compliance with its prohibitions. A self-regulated process of selection and appointment of foreign sales
agents can ensure that individuals of impeccable reputation are chosen and indoctrinated in U.S. legal requirements. A record of this process should document
that at all relevant times the U.S. exporter not only had no knowledge of any
illicit payment, but affirmatively strived to ensure that none would be made. This
"due diligence" investigative process, while not an explicit affirmative defense
to an FCPA charge, remains an implicit defense by demonstrating a lack of the
requisite knowledge of a corrupt payment.
Yet U.S. legal prohibitions remain only half of the equation. Compliance with
applicable foreign law is also required. With a focus once again on the use of
sales intermediaries, this article has surveyed foreign restrictions on their appointment and activities and suggested strategies for compliance. Payment incountry, use of retainers as opposed to commissions, disclosure to the customer
of the appointment, and choice of U.S. law have all been discussed. While some
reliance can be placed in the contractual representations of the foreign sales
agent, U.S. counsel must play an active role in researching foreign law and
finding an appropriate solution to any problems presented.
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